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Introduction
The contemporary South Caucasus-including the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia-is rife with challenges to human security. Ever since the break up of the USSR, the populations of the region are constantly affected by a plethora of socio-political and socio-economic problems. Of these issues, lack of good governance, entrenchment of authoritarianism, income disparity, widespread social inequality and systemic corruption are the most common challenges to human security. In contrast to many other postcommunist regions, the end of state communism in the South Caucasus coincided with the outburst of violent separatist conflicts. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts significantly contributed towards other challenges of post-communist transition.
In addition, the region also had to cope with the side-effects of a decades-long armed conflict in the neighbouring Russian North Caucasus. Corrupt governments, inefficient economies and the aftershocks of armed conflicts have kept the three South Caucasus's countries at the lower end of most human development, democratic governance and market competitiveness indexes and rankings for the last two decades. Today, the challenges to human security in the South Caucasus region are not significantly different from the immediate post-Soviet period. In Armenia, while the patrimonial ruling elites remain adamantly resistant to change, a stalled transition to a market economy has been accompanied by a democratic reform process that has moved at a glacial pace. In Georgia, political transitions and the modest progress achieved by efforts at democratization are still hindered by economic and political challenges. Over the past ten years, oil-rich Azerbaijan has become further bogged down in authoritarianism.
Of course, lack of democratic governance, weak unstable economies and failures of post-communist transformation efforts are not unique to the South Caucasus. Rather, the majority of non-Baltic former Soviet countries are afflicted by the similar absence of human security, which is characterized both by the lack of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. Amongst a diversity of coping mechanisms developed by postSoviet societies to deal with a deficit of good governance and significant economic hardship, reliance on informality-informal inter-personal networks and the 'shadow economy'-is omnipresent; such reliance has been ingrained into the social culture. The South Caucasus was not an exception. The tradition of relying on informal networking in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia not only dates back to the pre-Soviet period, but is also entangled in a web of kinship, clan and ancestry, which distinguishes it from the culture of informality in the Eastern European post-communist countries.
This paper seeks to examine the function of informal networks as sources of human (in)security in the post-communist South Caucasus. The key argument is that two decades of human insecurity that followed the end of Soviet rule in South Caucasian republics encouraged the growth of informal networks, well-rooted in the region and has allowed them to perform some of the state's functions. Of these, the role of informal networking is crucial in family support, healthcare, education, employment, community welfare and others functions commonly reserved to the state and civil society. However, apart from such positive roles, these informal networks have also hindered democratic reforms and undermined institution-building by encouraging corruption and clientelism, thereby exacerbating long term human insecurity for the population at large.
Rather than examining the relationship between informal networks and human (in)security in each of the South Caucasus' countries, this article uses the South Caucasus region as a single case study, employing a regional approach. Despite their linguistic, religious and political differences, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were once part of the same political regime (Soviet Union), they shared similar pre-Soviet history, they also share similar pathways of post-communist transformation and their societies have similar socio-cultural organization. This allows us to study these three countries as a single geopolitical region. While a cross-national analysis may illustrate divergences and convergences in each country, a regional approach will allow us to bridge these differences in order to provide a more generalizable account on how informal institutions affect human (in)security in a post-communist region.
This study relies on qualitative methods of inquiry and is based on empirical findings of 37 in-depth semi-structured elite (expert) interviews conducted by the author in Azerbaijan, Georgia and several major cities of Eastern and Western Europe. Two key categories of informants were interviewed: (1) policy experts and analysts employed at major international and local think-tanks and NGOs, and (2) scholars and researchers at major universities and research centres. The sample selection technique known as 'snowballing' sampling was based on identifying the key informants from the literature and internet search in accordance with their relevant expertise or work experience.
Additional participants were selected by employing 'referral' methods: asking informants to recommend other experts in the field. All interviews were structured as semi-formal discussions during which informants were asked to express their views and opinions and to share their professional experience on association between human (in)security and informal networking in the South Caucasus region.
In addition to expert interviews, this study has drawn its insights from participant 'freedom from want', by contrast, prioritizes socio-economic aspects of individuals' life and the provision of basic human needs-employment, welfare, healthcare, food and shelter. 13 However, these two fundamental principles of human security are not mutually exclusive. In the South Caucasus, and beyond, material insecurity is often intertwined with physical threats.
Having selected informal networks as the unit of analysis, the key priority of this study is human security of individuals, or populations, from socio-economic 'want' and socio-political 'fear'. Such an approach is best encapsulated in a statement by Picciotto et al. 14 who argue that '[h]uman security has to do with the well being of individuals rather than the protection of states'. Yet, human security from 'want' and 'fear' is irrevocably associated with the state and its institutions. 15 Hence, in this study a bottom-up approach to human security is blended with a focus on institutions, formal and informal alike, as causal factors of insecurity. Accordingly, the question of 'insecurity from whom' not only refers to socio-economic and socio-political hardships emanating from the failures of post-communist transition, but also to insecurity as a by-product of such failures.
In contrast to a voluminous body of academic literature on human security emphasizing the role of international actors in empowering local communities and individuals through development aid, promotion of good governance and a diversity of other exogenous mechanisms, 16 this paper's primary focus is on endogenous or local coping mechanisms of human security. The most commonly considered endogenous mechanisms of human security are reliance on religion, tradition, culture and identity. 17 This study adds to this list by examining the functioning of informal inter-personal networks as mechanisms of endogenous human security. 
Dimensions of human insecurity in the South Caucasus
Along with the devastating effects of separatist conflicts, present-day human insecurity in the South Caucasus stems from the weakness of state institutions and the detrimental impact such institutions have upon populations they attempt to govern. For over two decades after the collapse of the USSR, the pace of political transition in the region has been painstakingly slow. Only in Georgia has the pro-Western government of Mikheil Furthermore, rampant corruption in Armenia continuously keeps the country at the bottom end of international corruption rankings.
However, the failure of political transition is far more obvious in Azerbaijan than in neighbouring Armenia and Georgia. For the past twenty years, Azerbaijan, which has had no transition of ruling elites since the early 1990s, has been steadily descending towards significantly transforming the continuity of elites and the engraved into socio-political culture traditions. In contrast, reliance on long-term mechanisms of social adaptation became a time-tested reliable method of safeguarding human security. Perhaps the most widespread, albeit often neglected by the literature, coping mechanism of the affected by human insecurity South Caucasus's societies is the reliance on informal networks.
Networks as sources of post-communist security
A number of socio-political and socio-economic developments of the immediate post- Georgia mistrusted the leadership of their republics. 59 Yet even in Azerbaijan, 94% of public believed that having a political system controlled by a strong leader is not good.
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Entrenchment of authoritarianism and steady, albeit implicit, persecution of regime opponents began to increase by the late 1990s.
Structure of post-communist informal networks
What is the structure and composition of present-day informal networks in the South Caucasus? Traditional reliance on family and relatives defines the nature of networks in the region; strong 'bonding' within a network and weak 'bridging' between networks is a typical characteristic of the South Caucasus's informal networks. In the words of an expert, 'strong intra-network bonding of social capital is what Georgians and other ethnic 57 WVS, 'WVS 1990 -1994 , WVS 1995 -1998 However, in spite of the importance of friendship ties for the majority of population; 64 the distribution of public goods in friendship networks is never equal to the exchange of goods and services within kinship groups. As Misztal 65 wrote about communist-era informal networks, '[b]eing part of an informal circle was seen as the main way of achieving some level of social, financial and psychological security'. Hence, outsiders, including not-so-well-known friends, are generally treated with a degree of suspicion and will only be allowed into one's friendship circle after the necessary period of 'bonding'. For instance, an opening for a lucrative job will only be offered to a friend if no family or kin members are available to accept it. 66 However, favours of lesser importance, such as references needed to receive a preferential treatment in different state and non-state institutions, are often eagerly distributed to friends and even acquaintances with an expectation of reciprocity.
Owing to the limitations of one's kinship network in providing all necessary public goods, the maintenance of weak ties, or friendship and acquaintance networks is essential for one's personal wellbeing. Unlike informal networks in Russia and other Eastern European countries, 67 where reciprocal favours are distributed equally amongst friends and family members, South Caucasus's informal structures continue prioritizing kinship groups over friendship networks. 68 Such characteristic is both a legacy of the Soviet period, when the survival of traditional families was seen as one of the main goals of networking, and is a means of ensuring that the maximum amount of public goods is distributed amongst the members of kin groups.
'Freedom from want'
On surviving harsh economic recession of the 1990s, the economies of Armenia, Georgia No longer used to procure basic consumer goods, informal networks are now employed to obtain scarce public goods-such as jobs, financial loans, insurance, as well as access to healthcare, education and preferential treatment by state officials. The
Caucasus Barometer survey, 71 administered in all three South Caucasus's republics throughout 2011, revealed that over 30% of the public believed that connections are very important in finding a good job. A significant number (over 30%) of respondents also mentioned that they did paid or unpaid work for their family members. The role of networks in distribution of good jobs is not only determined by the lack of decent employment opportunities, but also by the low level of social trust. 72 For the majority of employers hiring a family member, relative or a close friend offers a better guarantee of an employee's qualities than a good reference letter and is also an opportunity for intranetwork bonding. 73 In the words of an expert:
Giving a job to a stranger, even if that person has positive references, is both risky and irrational. There is no guarantee that this person won't steal or won't let you down. It is much safer to hire a relative, or a good friend; they will be grateful to you for giving them the job and trust relations of people in Georgia, 52% in Armenia and 53% in Azerbaijan mentioned that they regularly borrow money for food. Over 60% of the public in Azerbaijan and over 40% in Armenia and Georgia also said that their ability to borrow money outside of the household is very limited. As echoed by an expert in Georgia:
It is an unwritten rule that to borrow some money you need to approach only the well-trusted members of your network-usually close relatives. They know that you have to return money and they will not ask for the interest. Also, unlike banks, they won't pressure you [to payback]. and Armenia thought that bringing a case to the court will make the problem worse. In comparison, only 22% of respondents in Georgia believed that applying to a court will make things worse. In 2013, over 80% of respondents in Armenia and around half of survey participants in Azerbaijan also believed that people are not treated fairly by the government. In Georgia, only 41% of the public thought that the government is unfair. It is due to this deeply entrenched in the South Caucasus's distrust to institutions and individuals, people prefer to do everything within their kinship and friendship circles, rather than dealing with formal institutions-be it a state institution or a non-governmental organizationboth are equally mistrusted and perceived as useless by the population.
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As a consequence similarly to the populations' response to socio-economic problems, the lack of efficient and transparent governance is met by higher reliance on informality and further erosion of trust towards the institutions. 
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The relationship between informal networks and corruption is twofold. On the one hand, bribes, often in a form of material gifts, are usually used as means of reciprocity to third-party individuals or non-network members. Since the exchange of goods and services through weak ties, connecting members of a particular network to their acquaintances and not-so-close friends, cannot often be reciprocated with favours, some transactions require a 'one-time' sign of gratitude. As explained by an expert:
Offering a gift in exchange for a service to someone who was recommended to you by a friend or a relative is not usually seen as bribery, but as a sign of gratitude to that individual and as a token of respect to a member of your circle who served as an intermediary. It is a social obligation.
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On the other hand, corruption is seen as a mechanism of dealing with formal institutions. Paying bribes to officials not only ensures faster and more efficient service, but also de-formalizes state institutions by incorporating them into networks. homogenous, exclusionist and kinship-centred. These characteristics allowed these networks to preserve traditions and culture and provide their members with material and public goods in times of scarcity. However, the lack of inter-network bridging, combined with high levels of intra-network bonding, leads to unequal distribution of public goods and a proliferation of clientelism and corruption. One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that the informal networks proliferate when no other effective mechanisms of human security are available to the population. When there is no sufficient 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from need', networks assume both positive and negative functions. It must then follow that the continuous commitment to democratic reforms, institution-building and the creation of social safety nets is needed to reduce not the reliance on networks as sources of human security but the networks' reliance on processes which are detrimental to human security principles.
